Döblin's "Nothing"
On from the dramatical beginnings at the Paris Conference, a virtual return to the casus belli 1914–1918 was brought into being. In this essay this hypothesis is being approached from the contemporary's literary point of view.
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"Nothing happened"
Subsequent to Weimar Germany's catastrophic years (1922–1923), a new currency was successfully introduced just before Christmas of 1923. Though apart from these domestic achievements, nothing seemed to come as a relief to the Germans. Under Britain and its colonists' lead, the Treaty of Versailles was dictated on this people. It had a devastating impact on (the nation's) generations to come. In 1924, Alfred Döblin's novel Berge Meere und Giganten (Mountains, Oceans and Giants) was published. As a starting point, this German doctor and novelist approached the events of the recently finished First World War, leaving an exhausted Europe in disarray. Since many historians and political commentators have contested the ending of its timeline until today, this blogpost highlights Döblin's literary centenary by focusing on a single passage about the supposed end.
'Es geschah nichts,' as the then 45-year-old author was quoted in the Aufa100 founding manifesto. The readership may thus be triggered by various reflections. Apart from the literary anniversary, our four-year-old quotation is being reflected on.
The first centres on history. Amid the horrendous experiences of the 1922–1923 occupation and hyperinflation, Döblin's words may well be regarded as a symbol of the most crucial episode of what would become known as the 'seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century' (George Kennan, 1979). In contrast to unilateral and exclusivist use of symbols such as the poppy – think of the often disregarded Vergissmeinnicht –, this term was adopted in all language domains. Though an opposite trend was to copy a military historian's scope of 1914–1918. Kennan's definition of terms did not fall short of the five-year-period with its unpopular climax on June 28th, 1919. For Germany, the covert and predominantly colonial and imperial power play in Paris concurred simultaneously with the first and second revolution. Did truly nothing happen? Not from the United States delegation's and the allied point of view: on the fifth anniversary of the Austrian archduke's violent death in Sarajevo, the three-time prolonged armistice was terminated.
As a matter of fact, their initial decisions in winter cannot be interpreted as anything but a massive assault on the ceasefire agreement. The summer-time clauses, first and foremost the well-known attribution of war guilt, obviously added up to it. The real question to investigate ever since is: was, from the perspective of all the armistice signatories, the state of war lifted on this momentous June, 28th? Apart from the Weimar/Russia analogy, Aufa100's mission in memory and history is being defined by this question. Against this backdrop, the German author's intentions with his imposing words is being questioned. One may argue that, from his viewpoint, the conservative forces managed to survive and keep control despite the many breath-taking events abroad and back home. Though nobody seems willing to refute the narrative that the ruling class of princes collapsed in the aftermath of emperor William's 1918 abdication. Furthermore, for what reason should a critical writer argue that nothing happened, when the nation's ways of access to the outside world was entirely disrupted? Obviously, the two British delegations in Paris took care of this total ban: firstly, Germany's river mouths were shut down. Secondly, following the Armistice-based disarmament and internment of Germany's navy, the perception of its confiscation in violation of the ceasefire was real. In the wake of the British conference delegation's halftime-ceasefire confiscation of the newly established republic's merchant navy, a similar fate for the disarmed Kriegsmarine in Scottish waters was being anticipated by the increasingly dispossessed Germans. On June 21st, 1919, what was being announced as the Armistice's final day, the German admiral Ludwig von Reuther ordered to scuttle the 71-vessel fleet. Thirdly, before the one-month break of the Anglo-American conference leaders at the end of the winter, the German colonial empire was secretively destroyed as an immediate result of their decrees (diktat). In May, this violation of a nominally retained armistice agreement became known among the Germans. Suffice to say, other German businesses beyond Europe were vainly hoping for a post-war continuation.
„Es geschah . . .
A second reflection centres on commemorative cultures. At the end of the 2014–2019 anniversaries, something peculiar was observed. On November 10th and 11th, 2018, the whole world assembled in Paris. Without exception, the heads of state and government commemorated the armistice's hundredth anniversary. Since the end of the Great War took on a firm form through the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty seven months later, it seemed logical, despite the temporal proximity, to cultivate memory again or to promote historical consciousness together. However, the follow-up event on June 28th, 2019 was characterised by collective abstinence from Europe's dignitaries. On the Treaty's centenary day, only guests from the United States commemorated the formal end of the ceasefire on this historic location. They were invited by the United States World War One Centennial Commission (WWICC), whose insightful podcasts on the events of Paris were to be continued until late autumn. Not only from an academic point of view, it would have been exciting to ask the well-travelled participants whether it seemed strange to them that none of the European partners seemed to care about a corresponding culture of remembrance.
While the war may have been lost by Germany, the peace was lost by its enemies and about a dozen of their invitees, first and foremost by the predominant British and their colonial delegates. Thus, neither war nor peace, 'nothing happened' may well reflect this intricate standstill.
The final of three reflections centres on historiography. The German doctor's impression of immovability may be indicative of the still contended history of the seven-month armistice period. Even past the anniversaries, the Anglo-Saxon narrative has prevailed.(1) Thus, if one was socialized in countries such as Canada or Great Britain, open-ended interpretations, be it a novelist's one, may not be appreciated. To the detriment of Woodrow Wilson – the first United States president visiting and sojourning in Europe (from 13 December 1918) –, British delegations took to postpone the peace conference. The acclaimed visitor's dwellings in Paris and London were thus dragged on. In the new year, when David Lloyd George and Jan Christian Smuts travelled to the French capital in the footsteps of the other allies, as well as the associated American, the highly opportunistic and colonially preoccupied duo overpowered them by presenting a second delegation under the Union Jack. Under the leadership of the South African general turned politician, it comprised five sections of Empire colonists. To make this work, the overburdened conference agenda was unilaterally reversed by prioritising the colonial question.
Five months later, having left the floor to their French ally and conference host from mid-March onward, the concluding act in Versailles was certainly not set-up with the intention of leaving the 1914–1919 global war open-ended.
Over the past decade covering the Great War anniversaries, a new interpretation of this world war's events has developed. Historians in the Anglo-American hemisphere invented the thesis of the Greater War (link xyz). A few colleagues from Germany joined them. According to Robert Gerwarth, Jay Winter, Erez Manela, Elisabeth Piller and Jörn Leonhard a.o., the world war was not terminated in 1919 respectively in Compiègne/Rethondes the year before, but in 1923–1924, ten years after the Sarajevo murder. Thus, following a decade of global warfare, peace was finally restored when Döblin's intriguing novel was published. Suffice to say, a commensurate 2023 or 2024 centenary was not heard of.
Our transnational commission's core focus is to contest the Anglo-American hypothesis to which clearly Anglo-Saxon embedded historians with a German background are contributing. Freiburg's Leonhard was the latest to join them. As a post-centenary start-up, we did not dispose of anything near the allocated resources. We need both time and resources to counter their western-centric thesis. Anticipating forthcoming research results, a major critique is that the position of Weimar Germany is simply being disregarded, for example in contrast to Turkey's. In Döblin's partially futuristic scenarios, there are no wordings from which any actuality reflecting perceptions of an impending peace (1923–1924!) could be deduced. Surely, Es geschah nichts may well be interpreted as an analogy to the continued world war respectively state of war. In the end, history's mainstream narrative remains to be questioned and consistently challenged. When it is argued by historians or in educative textbooks that the 'first post-war order' (Versailles) was a peaceful one and the Paris suburb's treaties with Germany, Austria, Turkey, Hungary and Bulgaria dictating an altogether hard peace, transnationally coordinated argumentation favouring a completely different analysis of the facts needs to be brought up.
Peter de Bourgraaf
Footnotes
1. In contrast, see footnote 26 of Roger Peace and Jeremy Kuzmarow, Historiography: Contested histories of the Great War, see footnote 26, https://peacehistory-usfp.org/ww1-hist/.