German vs League – Russian vs NATO

Paris/Weimar/Versailles' High Reparations? No Problem

The 1919 question of handling reparations fell into the category of history repeats itself. Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, la Grande Nation was forced to pay compensatory damages to the newly formed German Empire.

In historiography, primarily pointing at the astronomical amount of reparations from the side of the Weimar Republic, may well be criticised in the face of striking novelties. At the time, the Germans were basically not left another choice than accept the oftentimes deadly burden that came with the unparalleled events. First of all, France intensifying their efforts to receive compensation from Germany may have been assumed as apparent. Almost fifty years after the continental conflict and the promotion of Prussia's king to German emperor, the subordinate party had to endure a considerably harsher treatment by Britain and its Entente partner, the restored owner of Alsace-Lorraine after the Armistice Agreement. Not the vengeful France, but rather Great Britain took the lead. Paris's share of Weimar's towering reparation payments paled in comparison to that of London (G-H. Soutou 2015, P. de Bourgraaf 2018). This may surprise many. In mainstream history writing, France was known for claiming indemnities and stepping up claims for years to come. Assets such as Germany's confiscated submarines, an ad hoc reimbursement for the scuttled high-see fleet (June 21th, 1919), or the grand total of colonial possessions which size in square meters outshone Germany's pre-war territory more than five times, may have been ignored. All of this was enforced by David Lloyd George's delegation as well as Britain's colonial forces from the southern hemisphere at the Paris conference. Even when France got its share of the colonies, in contrast to Alsace-Lorraine in defiance of the Armistice agreement, the maritime and overseas claims contributed to its Entente-partner's eclipsing rate. After the British delegations in Paris were able to secure their disparate war goals one by one over the first phase of the 1919 conference in Paris, their common interest was to restrain an increasingly intransigent France.

Between three to five years into the new order, the Weimar Republic was confronted with another claim from the Entente and League of Nations leader. The French side had nothing to do with the 1922 naturalisation crisis. A novelty by itself was that the losing side was confronted with and had to swallow new orders in the course of years to come. On top of the Treaty and League of Versailles' two guilt clauses, new verdicts on Germany were introduced ten years after the outbreak of the war. How was the 1922–24 naturalisation crisis countering the thesis that Britain wished to mitigate the 1919 diktat's harsh consequence for Germany?

Almost ten years after the beginnings of the world war, an identity crisis struck the remaining Germans out of the Heimat. During the three-times extended ceasefire between 1918 and 1919, the majority of the German colonists was deported back to the virtually decolonised motherland. Needless to say, the British once again acted in contrary to the armistice conditions.

Wholesale new was Paris' policies of ethnic cleansing, to put it in terms of contemporary usage. In the Summer of 1922, Raymond Poincaré, wartime president and now acting foreign secretary, announced the expellation of the Germans from Alsace-Lorraine. Following the first wave of extraditions in 1918–1919, the remaining Germans were endangered of losing their existence once more.

No matter if overseas or in Europe, both Entente powers kept harassing people of German nationality for years to come. From October 1st, 2022 until the end of 2024, Aufa100 commemorated the centenary of the naturalisation crisis. A second wave of deportation threatened the remaining Germans in the South-African mandate of neighbouring South-West Africa. While the majority of German colonists had, most notably during the seven-month Armistice, been deported to Europe (by British colonial and military forces), the threat of naturalisation endangered the ones who had escaped deportation. Under the lead of Jan Christiaan Smuts, the returned leader of the British Delegation complementing British Imperial Delegation during the prolonged ceasefire, the Union of South Africa wanted to automatically naturalise the Germans. Obviously, this threat to national identity did not at all contribute to the stabilisation of the Weimar republic.

In history writing, it is still an open secret that an increasingly self-asserted Pretoria would not let loose from the wartime goal of outright annexation. With Smuts in Europe from early 1917 until the summer of 1919, this goal was pursued at the cost of the novel League of Nation's principles. With the mutually acceptable conditions of the 1918 ceasefire in mind, this meant putting any lasting peace settlement at risk. Obviously, this differs from narratives that most of us have been led to believe. Smuts was supposed to rule the self-created C-mandate on the north-western border on behalf of the international organisation termed League. In Weimar Germany's multifaceted crisis year of 1923, his naturalisation plan would be submitted to its British Secretary General (A. Wempe, Revenants of the German Empire, p. 96-102).

Apart from his military and political career, Smuts became known as an ardent support of holism. In stead of benevolent support for Germany's infant democracy, he kept on practising the Treaty and British-led League policies of exclusion and international isolation for Germany and German individuals. Entente forces all around the world did all they could in order to sustain Weimar's outcast status.

More than mainstream history, this story may well contain lessons for the present of the post-Soviet order. It is commonly known how Baltic state's Russian minorities were treated at the time of the new Russian Federation and its fledgling democracy. In other newly created states within the post-Soviet vacuum that were incorporated in the West's military alliance, a person of Russian origin was treated no better way than his Weimar twin of 1923. From the perspective of post-war timelines, the naturalisation crisis may have found an obviously alarming parallel. Crises such as this one create defection and thus potential soldiers to a distant future, be it roughly a decade in the first post-war order or two decades into today's one (see footnote P. Keating).

(footnote 143)  BBC News, "Aberystwyth plaque marks town's 'shameful' episode", https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-40195234; Glenford Howe, lecture World War I and nation building in the West Indies, In Flanders Fields Museum und CEGESOMA. To end all wars? Geopolitical aftermath and commemorative legacies of the First World War. Ypern, Belgium, 22-25 August 2018.

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