Inflation of Guilt Culture
On March 30th, 2023, an article titled ‘1923 Toxic Papers’ appeared in Germany's weekly magazine Der Freitag. A highly simplified portrayal and interpretation of the unilateral restoration of peace in the course of the mutually agreed ceasefire after an increasingly exhausting global war is offered by historian Rudolf Walther.
Walther did not succeed in applying the rules of historical critique. At the same time, one may argue that the prevailing narrative's fallacy was exposed.
In 1914, Russia took the initiative of mobilisation which caused their German adversaries to follow. Except for Germany and its Austrian ally, none of the great powers had to cope with the Mittellage's strategic disadvantage. Three years of warfare later, the economic term 'first in, first out' would be applicable. The czarist regime crumbled. In 1917, the Triple Entente ceased to exist when Russia was the first to give up on the war. A few weeks after the restoration of peace in Eastern Europe, the United States joined the thus reduced Allies in their war efforts. Eventually, the four-year stalemate on the western front was successfully broken up by the fresh input of the American Expeditionary Forces.
In contrast to the starting point, the end of the war in the west is characterised by a now century-old controversy. Particularly for a dictated and isolated Germany as a consequence of the Treaty and League of Versailles, neither in the 1920s nor 1930s did peace seem to return (thesis of a second Thirty Years' War). The newspaper and Mr. Walther addressed the 1922–23 crisis in the Weimar republic. The Swiss author presents a frail framework of events surrounding Germany's debt and hyperinflation as a consequence of the dictated peace. According to him, in autumn 1918 'the armistice with France was negotiated.' This perpetuates a widespread view that the role of Great Britain, Georges Clemenceau's leading Entente partner, was inferior to that of the 1919 peace conference host. However, history clearly shows that the ceasefire was concluded between an imploding German Empire and an obviously British-led Entente with France acting as the conference virtual leader's subordinate.
In mainstream historiography, the French are attributed a leading role. It was not until the middle and final parts of the conference, when the British delegations had secured their expansive aims, that they left centre state to their main ally. Almost 85 years later, a similar development would occur when Germany's government under Gerhard Schröder vehemently criticised the Anglo–American war course towards Iraq, with France following suit. With the media playing a tragic role in many respects, history seems to imagine the French government as the driving force behind this continental opposition.
In their relations with the United States as an indispensable junior partner over the prolonged ceasefire of 1918–19, Great Britain succeeded in retaining supremacy with the help of its separate delegation of colonists. The representatives of three Dominions (colonies), all located in the southern hemisphere, placed their war-related independence claims ahead of all common interests in peace and a sustainable post-war order. The allies and the associated US delegation retreated in the face of this overwhelming force. The British double delegation took them by surprise. In comparison, the influence of the heavily affected front-line state of Belgium paled against that of the British Imperial Delegation under the lead of David Lloyd George's colonial hero Jan Christiaan Smuts. The roots of the deadly dictate to the Weimar Republic do not lie in Paris but in London and the Empire (e.g. Karlheinz Lüdeking 2019, Peter de Bourgraaf 2020, 2018, see Aufa100 founding manifesto). Far from bringing in France's exuberant claims on Germany, this imperialist seizure of power caused the United States to oppose its first president visiting Europe and to withdrew from the treaty and the presidential league (Senate resolutions on November 19th, 1919, and March 19th, 1920).
As a post-centenary transnational and cross-disciplinary initiative, Aufa100 aims to expose widespread unawareness regarding the events in the fifth and final year of World War I and its consequences. This made a sharp contrast to the full stop of centenary commemorations in 2018. The memory lapse persisted across Europe. Many Europeans, most notably the European Union, were apparently consumed by the long-lasting Brexit chaos. Just like a hundred years before, the United States made for a positive exception. On June 28th, 2019, not a single other nationality joined the Americans in holding a grand commemorative ceremony in Versailles. Teachers from the East to the West coast were invited to partake in an educational program. Where did the Europeans go when they left their home to the Americans? By late autumn 2019, further exhibits of US memorial culture were to made publicly available.
In the second century following the events of the world war, Germany's taboo surrounding the outcome has largely persisted. How does this affect the country's role in the proxy war between the United States and the Russian Federation? The current warfare started in 2014, one century after the outbreak of World War I. When it comes to lessons from the past, history and memory of this war hold much more than their Second-World-War parallels. Mutual understanding clearly forms the basis for acceptable conflict resolutions.
In a second interpretation of the Swiss-German article, the reader should be sceptical about the claim that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk surpassed the West's treaty of one and a quarter of a year later in 'brutality'. On the one hand, the new Russia, a deflected ally, was not contractually banished from the world by its opponent, as happened to the similarly revolutionary Germans during the winter of 1919 on both moral high ground and, as far as colonial rule is concerned, in a totalitarian style. On the other hand, none of the French conference hosts were directly responsible for the secret dissolution of Germany's colonial empire. Both this British-led decolonisation and the corresponding exile acts could be seen as a blatant violation of the armistice agreement. At the same time, the double delegation absolved themselves of responsibility for this breach. Its far-reaching consequences would speak volumes. According to Mr Walther's hyperinflation article, the Germans faced a single guilt clause, an argument that might go virtually unopposed. However, this overlooks the fact that the British line of argumentation regarding the colonial clauses that triggered the concept treaty as a whole would permanently stigmatize the people and nation of the dissolved mother country. The well-known colonial guilt clause (Kriegsschuldlüge) emerged a few months after this outcome of the prioritised colonial question. Following this surprising priorisation, the Anglo-American leaders of the conference sailed home for a one-month break (February/March). With this delay of Europe's domestic affairs, Lloyd George managed to legitimise the arrival of extreme nationalist colonists and their prompt participation on a level surpassing allies such as the increasingly frustrated Belgians. The so-called ‘colonial guilt’ lie preceded the blame assigned in the first summer week – coinciding with the total loss of Germany's seven-month interned navy on June 21st.
Thirdly, a one-to-one constellation, such as Brest-Litovsk, is, particularly from the perspective of the ceasefire requesting party, fundamentally different from the dictate of a British-led alliance of thirty ratifying Versailles states respectively 25 of them plus Empire colonies.
Lastly, it seems questionable whether the accumulating humiliations were largely accepted as being 'symbolic' at the time. A century later now, the historical amnesia, if not dementia, of a would-be decolonising Europe explains the reluctance to accept certain facts. As a result, few Europeans noticed that the facts were addressed by the United States World War One Centennial Commission in a fitting and orderly manner.
Peter de Bourgraaf
Many thanks to Theo Mayer, Program Leader and Chief Technologist of the Doughboy Foundation, for his promptly offered translation services 🇩🇪 > 🇬🇧
